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course 
his representation of Molen in a felony criminal proceeding arising in Boise County, State 
oflda_ho. Molen appeals 
favor of Christian. 
propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
II. Course Of The Proceedings 
On September 19, 2005, the Boise County Prosecutor charged Molen with the 
offense of Felony Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child in Boise County Criminal Case State 
v. ~Molen, CR 2005-1748. On November 7, 2005, Christian substituted as counsel ofrecord 
in Molen's criminal case. 
Molen's criminal jury trial was to commence on January 10, 2007, but Christian 
arrived at the courthouse incapacitated by alcohol and unable to function. The jury trial 
was vacated and reset to June 18, 2007. Christian was in alcohol in-patient treatment during 
February 2007 and March 2007. (Clerk's Record, Page 7 hereinafter "R, p.'} 
Molen's criminal case proceeded to jury trial on June 18, 2007. The jury returned 
a guilty verdict for the charge of Lewd Conduct with a minor. On January 4, 2008, Judge 
Carey sentenced Molen to a unified term of twenty (20) years, with eight (8) years fixed 
and 12 years indeterminate. Molen appealed, and the Court Appeals aJfirmed his 
relief, supported a requested 
appointment of counsel on July 14, 2011, and upon appointment of the district court, 
\Villian1 O'Connor substituted as counsel on October 26,2011. On May 3, 2012, Molen's 
counsel requested leave to withdraw due to health concerns. The district court granted leave 
to withdraw and appointed new counsel, David Smethers. From August 29, 2012 to March 
5, 2013, the district court granted three (3) requests for additional time to file an amended 
petition. On April 1, 201 Molen's counsel of record filed a Second Amended Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On April 2013, Molen filed prose an unsigned 56 
page Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
claims. (R., pp. 44 and 45). On April 10, 2013, Elisa G. Massoth substituted as counsel of 
record for Molen's post-conviction case. (R., p. 46). 
On December 26, 2013, Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a Statement of 
Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction Case. The parties agreed: "the combination 
of the very serious issues presented by ineffective preparation and investigation by trial 
counsel warranted post-conviction relief on the grounds that ML Molen's Constitutional 
rights were violated. (R., p. 295). The district court reviewed the Stipulation, but advised 
the parties it would not 
April 28 and April 14. 
the stipulated was set 
court 
3 
On June 17, 2014, the district court granted Molen's request for post-conviction 
relief based upon Christian's ineffective assistance. In its Decision, the district court found 
Christian's "performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in 1) failing 
to consult with and/or retain an expert in pediatric sexual abuse; 2) failing to discover the 
existence of the colposcopic photographs prior to trial; and 3) failing to request either a 
continuance of the trial or a mistrial so that the new evidence could be reviewed by an 
expert in pediatric sexual abuse." The district court vacated Molen's Judgment of 
Conviction and ordered Molen to be released from custody. (R., p. 63). Molen was 
incarcerated and in the custody of IDOC from June 2007 to June 17, 2014, 
approximately seven (7) years. 
Molen filed a Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on February 1 2015, 
seeking relief against Christian for legal malpractice and breach of contract (R, pp. 4-19). 
On March 10, 2015, Christian filed a Motion to Dismiss contending Molen's claims were 
time barred by the statute oflimitation. (R., pp. 20-23). Molen filed responsive briefing on 
April 2015. Molen denied his claims were barred by the statute of limitations because 
his cause against Christian accrued, statute 
1 20 (R, pp. Christian filed 
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Ms. Points: 
no dispute in case that 
some damage upon conviction, and there's nothing 
law that said two years after that claim accrued that the 
plaintiff could not have sued Mr. Christian for malpractice. 
There's nothing in the law that precludes Mr. Molen from 
suing Mr. Christian within two years of his statute of 
limitations accrued. He's free to argue that l was actually 
innocent. Just because he had a conviction sitting there, 
doesn't preclude him from suing Mr. Christian in 
malpractice. 
(Trans. ofHrg. on Motion to Dismiss, April 9, 2015, ("Tr. Motion to Dismiss"), p. 




Mr. Molen's cause of action for criminal legal malpractice 
did not accrue until he was granted post-conviction relief, 
which was June 17 [2014]. 
The argument, Your Honor, is that convicted criminal 
defendant's cause of action doesn't accrue until his 
conviction is set aside, because until that time, he has 
suffered no legal damages or harm, and exoneration, as I 
suggested, is the gateway to the damages. This is because a 
convicted criminal is deemed by law to be guilty of the 
crime. Until relief, his conduct is the [proximate] cause of 
that conviction. 
Similar to a 1983 claim, as as a malicious 






'-''"''''-"'''"' your legal a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, can sue your attorney for 
your conviction. I submit that any attorney that's placed in 
that position is immediately going to file a 12(b)(6) motion, 
as the plaintiff cannot prove any legal cognizable damages. 
Also, that the proximate cause of any damages would be the 
criminal conduct of the defendant 
As the Supreme Coutt in the Heck case points out, allowing 
the convicted criminal to sue . . . his attorney when there is 
an outstanding criminal judgment creates a possibility of two 
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same transaction. 
Mr. Molen was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to 20 
years of prison, Your Honor. He diligently complied -with the 
procedural process, and he was granted post-conviction 
relief based on defendant's ineffective assistance. He spent 
seven years in prison. This is not a common occurrence, 
Your Honor. 
The court should rule that in this context of a criminal 
malpractice case, when the plaintiff has been granted post-
conviction relief, the accrual date is the date that he was 
granted that post-conviction relief. 
(Tr. Motion to Dismiss, p. 8, L 14-16, p. 10, L 10-1 p. 13, L 10 p. 14, L 9, p. 15, L 
12). At the close of the hearing, the district court determined to take the matter under 
advisement, as the application of the "exoneration rule" for purposes of the statute of 
limitations was an issues of first impression in Idaho. (Trans. Motion to Dismiss, p. 19, 
1 
language in 
stating are disfavored, 1t 1s 
unlikely Idaho will adopt a dual track procedure as required in Colorado. 
Second, it seems all of the states rejecting an exoneration-type rule have a 
'discovery' type rule place related to their statutes oflimitations. 
The court notes the decision to adopt an exoneration rule ultimately must 
be made by the Idaho Supreme Court or enacted by specific legislation such 
as the legislation in the uniform post-conviction act that delays the 
requirement for filing . . 
(R., pp. 90-91). On August 7, 2015, Christian filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserting, once again, that Molen's claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations. Christian also gave considerable discussion and attention to the proceedings in 
Lamb v. A1anweiler, 129 Idaho 269 (1996), and argued that in the context of a criminal 
legal malpractice claim, a Plaintiff must prove the additional element of "actual 
innocence," while "exoneration" is not a required element. (R., pp. 244-63). Molen filed 
responsive briefing with supporting documents on September 21, 201 (R, pp. 264-336). 
Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the district court for oral argument 
on October I, 2015. Christian's counsel made the following arguments: 
Ms. Points: The law in Idaho is clear and very well-established. 
Albeit, there's only one criminal case that's with the 
appellate courts. That's the Lamb v. Manweiler case that we 
cited for you in great detail at all levels up through the 
appeaL It's very straightforward. When someone suffered 
some s when the statute accrues. 
There's no dispute. I don't think that 
6 
(Tr. of Hrg. on Motion for Summary Judgment, October 1, 201 ("Tr. Motion for 
Summary Judgment"), p. 21, L 10 p. 3). In response, Molen's counsel and 








I did discuss the Lamb decision in my memorandum, but I 
think there's an important point that needs to be emphasized. 
In the decision in Lamb, it strongly supports adopting the 
exoneration rule, Your Honor. The Idaho Supreme Court's 
ruling in Lamb is that by admitting guilt, Lamb could not 
show that his attorney [proximately] caused his damage. 
But, see, this case is significantly different. I guess this is an 
issue for discussion. This wasn't a guilty plea case. 
That is correct, Your Honor. 
So [unlike] Mr. Lamb, Mr. Molen did not enter a guilty plea 
That's correct. 
- he went to trial. And so Lamb can be distinguished on that 
point, and, you know, other state case law, or interpretation 
of what the Lamb decision did in Idaho, I think, is different 
than what the Supreme Court actually did in Lamb because 
I think that sentence may actually be dicta, not a statement 







s a issue pled 
I had had a factual basis for conviction and my counsel 
me bad advise, and had he given me different advise, I 
wouldn't have told the court everyihing that I knew", so I 
think that that is actually very different from the Lamb case. 
And I would agree with everything the court just said. 
However, in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lamb, 
their focus was on the fact that he made a valid entry of a 
guilty plea, and, therefore, based upon that alone, that 
established his legal guilt, which is the same thing as in a 
conviction that establishes legal guilt, and that was the focus 
in that case in Lamb. 
And the district court and the court of appeals focused on 
whether there was, you know, an issue of fact with actual 
innocence or whether . . the plaintiff in that case ... actually 
committed the underlying charge. The Supreme Court didn't 
address any of that. They just went directly to the fact that 
you were advised by the district court of what the charges 
were, and you've pled guilty. That's legal guilt. 
Right. And, so for the district court and the court of appeals 
opinion, those are not binding on this court cause they're not 
published, so they're not binding. What's binding is the 
Supreme Court decision that doesn't address those issues 
directly. 
Yes, and I agree with the court on that I just wanted to make 
the distinction that really what . . the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Lamb supports is that, if you're legally 
guilty, you don't have a cause of action on a criminal 
malpractice case. 
But, in case, the post-conviction him no 





filed a motion to '"'"''"""'., 
proposition that, well, legally so the proximate 
cause of his damages is due to the conviction, and also he 
likely would have argued for the exoneration rule, and I 
believe that a court would actually agree with that given the 
decision in Lamb because it speaks to legal innocence, not 
actual innocence. 
Well, other than the fact that this is a different Supreme 
Court than there was back in '96, or whatever, whenever 
Lamb was decided, so you can't necessarily say that they 
would rule consistently even though they have ruled once. 
That true. But, Your Honor, that's basically my position 
today. As far as, you know, the date, the accrual date for the 
statute of limitations purposes, we still maintain that was the 
date of exoneration. That's when there was objective proof 
of some damage, or, in the alternative we argued that, it can't 
be any sooner than June 21, 2014, which was the date Judge 
Owen ordered disclosure of all CARE records, which when 
that happened, we discovered that there was an undisclosed 
audio that was related to the physical examination conducted 
by Lisa Ortega. And, in that audio recording, it 
demonstrates, not only that the complaining witness made 
multiple [inconsistent] statements, but it also was the first 
time that there was an objective record that our expert could 
evaluate in Nurse Ortega's evaluation and examination 
during the physical examination. An updated affidavit was 
filed, and it was at that point when Judge Owen actually 
granted [Molen's] relief 
(Tr. Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15 p. 29, L 22). Once again, the district 
court took 2015. 
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Breach is not the only a cause 
the tort itself is completed, there is no actual accrual of the cause action, 
Just as in a normal negligence claim, there must be causation and damages. 
Thus, until there is both causation and damages, there is no accruaL 
(R,, pp. 352-53). Next, the district court acknowledged that "Idaho caselaw makes it clear 
that in legal malpractice cases, there is a possibility that a third-party action, or event not 
under the control of the parties, could be what starts accruaL (R p, 353). The district court 
noted that Christian alleged that the tort was complete on Molen's conviction in 2007, and 
Molen alleged the tort was completed 2014. However, there was little or no dispute as to 
the timing of events and therefore, there was no issue of fact Rather, the district court was 
required to decide when the cause of action accrued as a matter of law. (R., p. 354).1 
The district court stated that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lamb was not 
based on accrual, but on the element of causation. However, the Lamb decision provided 
"hints" to the resolution of this case. Id. The district court acknowledged that Lamb's guilty 
pleas were themselves the proximate cause of Lamb's incarceration. According to the 
district court: "Causation is still essential to an accrual determination, if the Court operates 
under a completed tort theory as stated in Minnick." Id. at p. 355. 
1 The district court noted that it had indicated it was to adopt 
exoneration such rule fit more line with Idai_11o' s public policy based on civil 
legal malpractice cases. Id. Once again, the district court declined to adopt 
rule, as "such adoption, it happens, must come through the Idaho Supreme 
10 
court 
The Court feels it is constrained to conclude that Plaintiffs causes of action 
against Defendant began accruing in 2007. The undisputed facts at this point 
in this case show that Defendant's conduct related to Plaintiffs criminal 
trial was sufficiently bad, that regardless of whether Plaintiff was actualiy 
guilty or not, there was 'objectively ascertainable occurrence of some 
damage' (and related causation) in 2007. Defendant showed up so drunk to 
the originally scheduled trial as to be essentially incapacitated. Defendant 
showed up inebriated to the rescheduled triaL Defendant's alcoholism 
arguably prevented him from doing sufficient pre-trial investigation and 
incapacitated his judgment in whether to move for a mistrial. These 
undisputed facts alone were sufficient to put Molen on notice of Christian's 
malpractice. \Vhile notice is irrelevant (because there is no discovery 
standard for malpractice actions,) the Court finds that the notice does create 
an objectively ascertainable occurrence of both causation and damages. 
The Court does not find this result particularly equitable. Plaintiff deserved 
better representation at trial, and it seems unfair to deny Plaintiff his right 
to pursue and prove damages against Defendant. However, the Court 
concludes this is the proper legal result under current Idaho caselaw as it 
stands today. There is no need for an outside event or act of a third-party to 
start accrual of the cause of action because the tort was completed in 2007 
when the jury entered a guilty verdict against Mr. Molen. 
Id. at pp. 355-56 (footnote omitted). Based upon the district court's ruling, it granted 
Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment Molen appeals the district court's decision. 
III. Statement Of Facts 
On or about June 23 2005, law enforcement investigated a report that Molen had 
engaged in sexual misconduct with step-granddaughter An interview between law 
enforcement and S.Z. was conducted. In the allegations 
sUiumers 2004 and 
11 
conduct ammor CR 
2005-1748. On November 7, 2005, Christian substituted as counsel of record in Molen's 
criminal case. The Criminal Information was filed with the District Court on January 9, 
2006. Molen pled not guilty at the arraignment Id 
On or about September 13, 2006, Christian was arrested for driving under the 
influence and open container. On or about January 4, 2007, Christian was arrested again 
for driving under the influence and driving without privileges. This case did not proceed to 
jury trial on January 10, 2007 because, on the morning of trial, Christian arrived at the 
courthouse so incapacitated by alcohol that he could not function, and the trial had to be 
vacated. Christian's BAC on the morning of trial was measured at .329/.344. The jury trial 
was vacated and reset to June 18, 2007. Christian was in alcohol in-patient treatment during 
February 2007 and March 2007. Molen was seriously concerned about Christian's ability 
to represent him, but he was not able to afford new counsel. Accordingly, Christian 
continued to represent Molen. (R, p. 7). 
From the time Christian was out of in-patient treatment ( end of March 2007), he 
did not maintain sobriety and failed to adequately investigate and prepare for Molen's triaL 
On or about June 2007, Molen, his wife his step-daughter met Christian 
Gar Hackney at house. this meeting, was so 
12 
D. smelled the odor of alcohol on breath 
trial and received comments from Christian's secretary that Christian would be better if he 
was able to take a few "nips" of alcohoL Connie also observed Christian under the influence 
during the triaL (R., p. 9). 
Nurse Ortega testified at trial that she conducted the CARES physical examination 
of S.Z. Nurse Ortega testified that when she performed a colposcopic examination of S.Z. 's 
vagina, she observed two healed tears of the hymen that were consistent with sexual abuse. 
Christian was unprepared to properly cross-examine Nurse Ortega because he failed to 
conduct a pretrial interview of her, and failed to communicate with his expert who would 
have prepared him for a proper cross-examination. (R., p. 10). 
During cross-examination of Nurse Ortega, she revealed that colposcope 
photographs of S.Z:s hymen were taken. Christian failed to immediately move for a 
mistrial or request a continuance so that these photographs could be reviewed by an 
appropriate expert. Rather, the photographs were shown to Molen's expert Dr. Friedlander 
approximately 90 minutes before testified. Dr. Friedlander testified that the photographs 
were not consistent with sexual abuse, but repeatedly testified that he would defer to a 
master pediatric gynecologist (R., p. I 0). 
13 
photographs, IS 
of the opinion that the photographs demonstrate a normal hymen. Dr. Guertin observed no 
notches, tears, lacerations, scars, or distortion. Molen also retained the expertise of Cari 
Carusso, an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. She has been a Registered Nurse since 1974, 
and is licensed and Board Certified as a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner by the 
State of California. Ms. Carusso reviewed the colposcopic photographs and concludes they 
demonstrate a normal genital examination. In her opinion, there is no evidence of healed 
tears as Nurse Ortega testified at trial and no evidence of sexual abuse. (R., p. 11 ). 
In May 2011, Mr. Molen filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising, inter alia, 
ineffective assistance of trial counseL Molen v. State, CV-2011-124. On or about April 
2014, Mr. Molen, through counsel, and the State learned of the existence of an additional 
recorded CARES interview of S.Z. that was never disclosed. In the interview, S.Z. made 
statements to Nurse Ortega that contradicted statements S.Z. had made in an earlier 
interview with Stacy Lewis and with her preliminary hearing and trial testimony. (R., p. 
12). 
On April 2014, Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a Joint Stipulation 
of Facts and Points of Authority Related to Brady Material and a Joint Motion 
Judgment in Favor of Molen. On June 1 2014, the district court a written 
14 
case. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
III. Whether The District Court Erred In Applying Existing Idaho 
Caselaw And Ruling That Molen's Cause Of Action Accrued On The 
Date Of His Conviction In 2007. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal deals with the review of the district court's Order granting Christian's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in a legal malpractice claim. "In an appeal from an order 
of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by 
the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgments." Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 
140 Idaho 522, 525 (2004) (internal citation omitted). Thus, when considering a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that 
party's favor. Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574 (1997). Summary judgment is appropriate 
only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other evidence in the record demonstrate 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Hines v, 129 Idaho 84 7 (1997). The burden 
138 Idaho 445 (2003). 
I. The District Court Erred In Applying Existing Idaho Caselaw And Ruling 
That Molen's Cause Of Action Accrued On The Date Of His Conviction In 
2007.2 
The district court ruled that Molen's complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations because Christian's "conduct related to [Molen's] criminal trial was sufficiently 
bad . . there was 'objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage' (and related 
causation) in 2007. (R., p. 355). According to the district court, Christian's sufficiently 
bad conduct, including: 1) Christian's drunkenness on the original date of trial; 2) 
Christian's inebriated state during the rescheduled trial; 3) Christian's alcohol abuse 
2 Molen maintains his position that his cause of action against Christian did not accrue until 
Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Molen filed his Compliant on 
February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute of limitations. In the district 
court's Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, the district court declined to rule specifically on 
the exoneration rule and instead held that "a material issue of fact exists whether that proof 
of Plaintiff's innocence was known before the 2014 discovery of conflicting statements 
made by the minor child witness, which were not disclosed by the prosecution." (R., p. 91 ). 
Molen addressed this issue in his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
For efficiency, Molen has elected not to address this issue in the body of this brief. 
However, in an abundance of caution, Molen incorporates those specific facts by reference 
and reserves the right to further address those issues at oral argument should this Court 
deem necessary. In summary, Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists in this case 
concerning the date he obtained objective proof of some actual damage. The date of 
objective proof can be no earlier than January 21, 20 when the district court in Molen' s 
post-conviction case ordered alJ CARES records. It was only after that date 
that Molen obtained the lh'1disclosed audio of the physical examination of the complaining 
witness. 
16 
Molen. Id. at ruling is erroneous. 
While Molen would not deny that Christian's performance fell well below an 
objective standard ofreasonableness, this does not lead to the legal conclusion that Molen's 
cause of action accrued in 2007, simply because Molen may have been on "notice". Rather, 
Molen's cause of action did not accrue until his petition for post-conviction relief was 
granted, that was the date the tort was complete. Prior to that date, Molen could not 
establish that Christian was the proximate cause of damages that Molen suffered. Molen 
was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014, and he filed his Complaint on 
February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations. 
"An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced 
within two years after the cause of action accrues." Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman, PA., 154 Idaho 21, 24 (2013) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he cause of action 
for professional malpractice accrues as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission [ of 
which a party complains]." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585-86 (2002) (internal 
citations and quotation omitted} a cause of action "cannot accrue until some 
damage has occurred. City of A1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,659 (2009). There must 
be objective proof that would support the some at 661. 
"[S]ome damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause action 
17 
case. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543 (1991 ). "Likewise, what constitutes 'objective proof' of the 
existence of some damage suffered by the client also must be decided on the circumstances 
of each case." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 662. 
In its Order Granting Summary Judgment, the district court first addressed this 
Court's accrual discussion in Afinnick. (R., pp. 351-52). The district court correctly 
reasoned that pursuant to }vfinnick, and other Idaho case law: "until the tort itself is 
completed, there is no actual accrual of the cause of action. Just as in a normal negligence 
claim, there must be causation and damages. Thus, until there is both causation and 
damages. there is no accrual. (R., p. 352) (emphasis added). This reasoning is sound. 
Causation and damages are both elements a plaintiff must prove in a cause of action for 
professional malpractice. See e.g Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136 (2004) ("We 
have always stated the fourth element of the cause of action, however, as requiring proof 
that the attorney's breach of duty was a proximate cause of injury or damage to 'the 
client Until a plaintiff can make a prima facie case for legal malpractice, there can be 
no accrual of the statute of limitations. 
In Idaho, is no binding authority directly on point on the of when a cause 
action for criminal legal malpractice accrues, a criminal defendant successfully 
18 
prior to that point, a complaint could not a motion to dismiss); 
Therrien v. Sullivan, 153 N.R 211 (2006) (holding limitation period regarding a criminal 
legal malpractice claim would not accrue until the defendant obtained direct or collateral 
relief from underlying criminal conviction as action cannot withstand motion to dismiss); 
Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997) (holding statute oflimitations does not begin 
to run until termination of post-conviction proceedings); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 
(Fla. 1999) (holding convicted criminal defendant's action for legal malpractice against 
defense counsel did not accrue until obtaining appellate or post-conviction relief); see also 
Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., Pub. Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991) 
(holding convicted criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing 
action for legal malpractice against former attorney, and statute of limitations must be 
tolled until such relief is granted). The requirement of successful direct or collateral relief, 
prior to filing suit against the criminal defense attorney for criminal legal malpractice, is 
commonly referred to as the "exoneration rule." 
though the court declined to adopt the exoneration rule in its two 
previous decisions, it was inclined to do so "because such rule fit more in line with Idaho's 
19 
to v,J_UC'-VL 
i"A,~AUPr.C•rl on a malpractice 
had the City prevailed in the litigation. Even when an attorney is 
negligent, that breach of duty may not be a proximate cause 
resulting damage to the client. 
Under the circumstance of this case, the existence or effect of any alleged 
negligence on the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their legal advice 
and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation against the City 
by Wausua and St. Clair. There would not be objective proof of actual 
damage until that occurred. To hold otherwise in this case would foment 
future litigation initiated on sheer surmise of potential damages in order 
to avoid the likely consequences of seeing actions barred by limitations. 
Clients involved in lengthy litigation would have to file protective lawsuits 
against their attorneys when following their advice and strategy, without 
yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being able to prove a 
cause of action for professional malpractice. 
Id. at 662-63 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added by district court). 
The district court then states the following: 
This language supports the conclusion that it makes little sense for a 
person to rely on their attorney, only to be required to file anticipatory 
claims against their attorneys or risk losing the chance to sue for 
malpractice. 
In criminal cases, the incentives are reversed. If a person is convicted, that 
person would have to simultaneously sue their attorney for malpractice 
and continue to seek relief on appeal and/or seek post-conviction relief. 
The direct appeal may or may not be completed before the two-year 
statute of limitations runs. It is unlikely the post-conviction relief decision 
will be completed within two years of the original judgment. Other states 
have noted the disparity between civil and criminal legal malpractice 
claims. May states reject barring a criminal defendant from bringing a 
malpractice claim unless it is brought within the given tirneframe after 
conviction. Instead, in these states, accrual of the statute of 




criminal defense attorney. The defense attorney moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that the two year statute of limitations had run, and trial court granted the 
motion. Id. at 223, On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that the pivotal 
inquiry at issue was determining "when plaintiff is deemed by the law to have suffered 
harm that may be attributed to defendant's alleged negligence. Id. at 228. The court stated 
that "legally cognizable harm, in a criminal legal malpractice case, was something more 
than a plaintiff being wrongfully convicted, Id at 228-29. In ruling that a criminal 
defendant had not suffered harm until his conviction is set aside, the court made several 
observations. 
First, the court found that persons accused of crimes are afforded extensive 
constitutional and procedural protections. The completeness of the criminal justice process, 
from pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief proceedings, "demonstrates the 
legislature's intention that only those persons deserving of conviction will be, or will 
remain convicted:' Id at 230. Thus, the court concluded that is the public policy of this 
state to treat any person who has been convicted of any criminal offense as validly 
and until the conviction has been reversed . , Id the 
court reasoned that no outcome the trial process is as difficult to obtain as a 
Id at 231 Thus, the court ruled that a criminal defendant has not been harmed, until 
exonerated through direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise. Id. at 238. The 
statute of limitations did not accrue until the plaintiff suffered legally cognizable harm, 
which was the date he was exonerated of the criminal offense. Id. at 239. 
While not specifically addressing the issue of accrual, this Court's decision in Lamb 
v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269 (1996), supports the adoption of the exoneration rule. In 
Lamb, this Court addressed whether a plaintiff's cause of action could survive a motion for 
summary judgment against his former criminal defense attorney, for allegedly providing 
negligent advice in a criminal matter, which lead to the plaintiff pleading guilty and being 
sentenced to prison. In Lamb, this Court ruled if the complaining party is found legally 
guilty of the underlying criminal matter, the complaining party cannot establish that the 
criminal defense attorney was the proximate cause of the complaining party's damages. 
See Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274. Lamb was initially charged with nine felonies related to cattle 
operations. Id. at 271. Manweiler represented Lamb the initial stages the criminal 
case, and upon the advice of Manweiler, Lamb entered pleas of guilty to four felony counts. 
Prior to sentencing, Manweiler discovered evidence which cast doubt on two of the guilty 
pleas, and he moved to withdraw those pleas. district court granted that motion. 
be 
judgment The district court found the sole issue before the court was whether Lamb was 
guilty of the underlying criminal charges, and so, Lamb would be unable to establish the 
prima facie element of proximate cause. After review of the record, the district court 
concluded that Lamb failed to come forward with evidence to rebut his admissions of guilt 
or establish an issue of fact regarding his guilt. The district court granted Manweiler' s 
motion for summary judgment. Id. 
On appeal from the Idaho Court of Appeals, this Court reviewed Lamb's change of 
plea hearing, and concluded: 
From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that [Lamb] knew the elements 
and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges 
before he pled guilty. He also knew the choice of whether to plead guilty 
was his, not that of his attorney. The choices he had were explained by the 
district judge and acknowledged by ML Lamb. The proximate cause of any 
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a 
thorough advice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge. 
Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274 (emphasis added). 
Court based decision Lamb on the element of proximate cause ("The 
proximate cause of any damage [Lamb] may have suffered is [his] decision to plead guilty 
Thus, Lamb could not satisfy the prima 
could not prove Manweiler was proximate cause of damages. This analysis and 
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was 
In this case, court acknowledged that 
causation, however the district court's interpretation of that ruling was erroneous. In both 
Lamb's case and in Molen's case, legal guilt (Lamb from pleading guilty and Molen from 
being convicted) prevented both men from proving that their attorneys were the proximate 
cause of damages. Thus, neither could establish a prima facie case for criminal legal 
malpractice, unless they were "exonerated" and no longer legally guilty. As the district 
court correctly noted, "[ c ]ausation is still essential to an accrual determination, if the Court 
operates under a completed tort theory as stated in l'vfinnick." (R, p. 355). Plaintiffs 





Yes, and I agree with the court on that. I just wanted to make 
the distinction that really what the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Lamb supports is that, if you're legally 
guilty, you don't have a cause of action on a criminal 
malpractice case. 
But, in this particular case, the post-conviction made him no 
longer legally guilty. 
And that's what we're arguing, Your Honor. After he was 
exonerated, Mr. Molen was exonerated, he was no longer 
guilty. He was legally iunocent, and that was the gateway he 
had to pass through, the exoneration rule, in order to file a 
claim or a cause of action for criminal malpractice, 




Well, other than the fact that this is a different Supreme 
Court than there was back in '96, or whatever, whenever 
Lamb was decided, so you can't necessarily say that they 
would rule consistently even though they have ruled once. 
That true. But, Your Honor, that's basically my position 
today. As far as, you know, the date, the accrual date for the 
statute of limitations purposes, we still maintain that was the 
date of exoneration. 
(Tr. Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27, L. 24 - p. 29, L. 8).4 Other jurisdictions have 
agreed that a plaintiff cause of action for criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until 
exoneration, because a claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss as the plaintiff would 
be unable to establish that his attorney was the proximate cause of damages. 
For instance, this was the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 
which ruled that a criminal defendant's cause of action for criminal legal malpractice did 
not accrue until he was granted federal habeas corpus relief. Noske, 670 N.W.2d at 745. 
4 Interestingly, the district court declined to adopt the exoneration rule despite stating its 
well-reasoned position for being inclined to adopt the exoneration rule and having solid 
legal grounds to support this ruling, given the Lamb and Afinnick decisions. Yet, the 
district court creates a quasi "notice rule" to find "that notice does create an objectively 
ascertainable occurrence of both causation and damages" in Molen's case. It is also 
interesting that Christian's "sufficiently bad" pretrial and trial conduct, which was the 
basis for the district court's ruling on Molen having notice (i.e. causation and damages), 
appears to be the same cause for the district court's concern in ruling Christian's 
("The Court does not find this result particularly equitable. Plaintiff deserved better 
representation at trial, and it seems to Plaintiff right to and 
damages against [Christian]. (R., p. 356). 
25 
are an 
to relitigate an was a 
proceeding which resulted in a conviction that has not been reversed." Id. 
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that in order to recover 
damages under § 1983 based upon allegations that tend to impugn the validity of a criminal 
conviction, a plaintiff must prove "favorable termination" of the criminal action against 
him. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the common law 
action for malicious prosecution, as it was the closest analogy to the § 1983 claim. The 
common law imposed a "favorable termination" requirement in malicious prosecution 
actions. First, the Court stated that this requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the 
issues of probable cause and guilt. Id at 484 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Specifically, it prevents "the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after 
having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution;' a result that contravenes "a 
strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the 
same or identical transactions. Id. Second, it prevents "collateral attack on the conviction 
through the vehicle civil suit," which is not an appropriate mechanism to challenge the 
validity of an "outstanding criminal judgment Id at 484-86. Thus, the Court held: 
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisor1ment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 
or sentence on appeal, expunged 
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In this case, Molen's action not accrue, statute 
of limitations purposes, until he successfully obtained post-conviction relief. Prior to that 
date, there was no objective proof of some actual damage. Just like the plaintiff in Stevens, 
criminal defendants in Idaho are afforded extensive constitutional and procedural 
protections, including pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief. Unless a 
conviction is set aside, the criminal defendant is deemed by law to be guilty. As the court 
in Stevens explained, it would be "most unusual to permit a person to prosecute a legal 
malpractice action premised on some flaw in the process that led to that person's conviction 
at the same time that the person's conviction remained valid for all other purposes." There 
was no legally cognizable harm in Stevens until the plaintiff in that case had his conviction 
set aside. As in Stevens, Molen had not suffered any actual damage until he was granted 
post-conviction relief. 
The decision in Lamb and Noske further illustrates the fundamental flaw in 
concluding that at the time of conviction a criminal defendant has sustained some actual 
damage prior to defendant having his or criminal case set aside the plaintiff would 
be unable to establish that his former attorney was the proximate cause of damages 
(plaintiff could not withstand a motion to dismiss). With a criminal conviction the 
plaintiff is deemed by law to be guilty. Thus, prior to a being set ruling 
27 
See A1cCormack v. Caldwell, 1 Idaho 15 (CL App. 11) (recognizing "a 
cause of action generally accrues when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another") 
(internal citation and quotation omitted). Otherwise, a criminal defendant would be unable 
to maintain a lawsuit against his former criminal attorney for malpractice. 
The prudent policy considerations examined in Heck, which requires a plaintiff to 
prove "favorable termination" of the underlying criminal action to recover damages under 
§ 1983 action, are equally applicable in this case.5 Concluding a criminal defendant 
5 In addition to the policy issues addressed in Heck, courts holding that an action for 
criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until relief from the conviction is achieved, 
advance various policy arguments in reaching that conclusion. See e.g Trobaugh v. 
Sondag, 668 N. W .2d 577, 5 83 (Iowa 2003) (finding an action for criminal legal malpractice 
does not accrue until relief from conviction achieved, as such approach "preserves key 
principles of judicial economy and comity, including the avoidance of multiple 
proceedings related to the same factual and procedural issues, respect for other statutorily 
created processes such as postconviction relief, and the prevention of potentially wasteful 
practices such as requiring to file a legal malpractice claim which may never come to 
fruition ... "); Canaan v. Bartee, 276 Kan. 116, 123 (2003) (finding policy arguments for 
exoneration rule persuasive: equitable principles against shifting responsibility for criminal 
action; paradoxical difficulties of awarding damages to a guilty person; proving causation; 
potential undermining of post-conviction process; preservation of judicial economy by 
avoiding relitigation of settled matters; creation of bright line rule for statute oflirnitations; 
availability of alternative post-conviction remedies; and chilling effect on thorough defense 
lawyering); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 31 (2004) (holding "a rule that requires 
termination of the underlying criminal proceedings will conserve judicial resources; the 
outcome of post-conviction proceedings will often demonstrate that no malpractice suit 
will lie. Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361 (finding requirement of post-conviction 
judicial economy because many issues litigated in post-conviction will be duplicated later 
malpractice action); v. Mass.L.Rptr. 259 (2010) 
accrual prior to post-conviction would be detrimental to judicial 
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procedural protections place 
available to the criminally convicted to have a judgment set aside because of incompetence 
counsel, Stevens, 316 OL at 563 (quoting Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361-62), it would be 
inappropriate to allow criminal defendant to collaterally attack the outstanding criminal 
conviction. 
Molen respectfully submits that his cause of action did not accrue until his petition 
for post-conviction relief was granted, that was the date the tort was complete. Prior to that 
date, Molen could not establish that Christian was the proximate cause of damages that 
Molen suffered. Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014, and he filed 
his Complaint on February 1 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial counsel for Molen's criminal case was Ron Christian. Christian received 
disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar for his conduct involved in Molen's criminal 
case. The most problematic of Christian conduct was the depths of his alcoholism at the 
time that was supposed to be preparing and investigating the facts of the case for triaL 
economy because convicted criminals will "inundate the judicial system with motions to 
thereby the dockets and leaving open a myriad ofuuresolved cases for 
could be decades. 
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to proceed. a period of in-patient 
treatment, he continued to drink Christian continued to drink during the rescheduled triaL 
His drinking and alcohol abuse prevented him from performing sufficient pretrial 
investigation, including investigation of expert witnesses. Ultimately, Christian's drinking 
was out of control, and his alcohol abuse compromised his judgment during triaL He failed 
to move for a mistrial or a continuance, which was absolutely necessary given the late 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence and \\rith no defense expert who could properly examine 
and testify to the evidence. Christian should not be allowed to hide behind the statute of 
limitations, especially given the sound reasoning behind the exoneration rule and the 
decisions in Lamb and Minnick. Molen consistently maintained that he was innocent of the 
crime and refused to take any plea deal. After approximately seven long years in prison, he 
followed the appropriate legal process to finally win back his freedom. During that time in 
prison, he witnessed his wife Connie suffer from a brain aneurism and die, and Molen sat 
helplessly behind bars. Molen respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's 
Order Granting Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Dated this 25th day of April, 2016. 
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